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It is often said that there is a worldwide community of central
bankers. I certainly feel that way. Central bankers in all coun-
tries share a number of concerns. Perhaps the most important
of these is the desire for price stability. While central bankers
may differ in the ways they seek to achieve price stability—
differences grounded in our respective histories, customs, and
institutions—the goal we all strive for is no less important. 
Recognizing that no one country’s central bank
has a monopoly on the right answers, I would like to share
with you my views on why I believe price stability is so
important and what approaches can be taken to achieve
this goal. Before turning to these issues, we must first be
clear about what we mean by price stability and how to
recognize it when we see it.
In my view, a goal of price stability requires that
monetary policy be oriented beyond the horizon of its
immediate impact on inflation and the economy. This
immediate horizon is on the order of two to three years.
This orientation properly puts the focus of a forward-
looking policy on the time horizon over which monetary
policy moves today will have their effect and households
and businesses will do most of their planning. This is the
horizon that is relevant for the definition of price stability
articulated by Chairman Greenspan: that price stability
exists when inflation is not a consideration in household
and business decisions.
A central bank’s commitment to price stability
over the longer term, however, does not mean that the
monetary authorities can ignore the short-term impact of
economic events. It is important to recognize that, even if
we set ourselves successfully on the path to price stability
and even if, as a result, price expectations are contained, we
still will not have eliminated all sources of potential infla-
tionary shocks. The reality is that monetary policy can
never put the economy exactly where we want it to be.
For example, supply shocks that drive prices up
sharply and suddenly—such as the two oil shocks of the
1970s—are always possible. In such an eventuality, the
appropriate monetary policy consistent with a goal of price
stability would not be to tighten precipitously, but rather
to bring inflation down gradually over time, as the econ-
omy adjusts to the shift in relative prices. In the event of a
shock to the financial system, the appropriate monetary
policy might require a temporary reflation.
These comments are based on remarks delivered by Mr. McDonough
before the Annual Financial Services Forum of the New York State
Bankers Association on March 21, 1996, and the Economic Club of
New York on October 2, 1996.2F R B N Y  E CONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / AUGUST 1997
As you can see, I believe that monetary policy
must be exercised cautiously. Why do I say this? Because
contracts, especially wage contracts, can outlast a good part
of, or even exceed, short-term shocks in duration. In the
short term, therefore, monetary policy must accept as given
the rigidities in wages and prices that these contracts
create. Abrupt shifts in policy, given these rigidities, espe-
cially a monetary tightening in the face of wages that are
unlikely to be cut, can cause unacceptable rises in unem-
ployment and drops in output.
WHY PRICE STABILITY IS SO IMPORTANT 
AND SO DESIRABLE
In my view, a key principle for monetary policy is that price
stability is a means to an end—to promote sustainable
economic growth. Price stability is both important and
desirable because a rising price level—inflation—even at
moderate rates, imposes substantial economic costs on society.
All countries incur these costs. They entail, for example:
• increased uncertainty about the outcome of business
decisions and profitability;
• negative effects on the cost of capital resulting from
the interaction of inflation with the tax system;
• reduced effectiveness of the price and market systems;
and
• in particular, distortions that create perverse incen-
tives to engage in nonproductive activities.
Let me be even more explicit about the negative
effects of one particular type of nonproductive activity
induced by inflation’s distortion of incentives—the
overinvestment of resources in the financial sector. As a
former commercial banker, I am especially aware of the sig-
nificance of this cost, and I believe that it deserves greater
attention than it often receives in economists’ lists of the
costs of inflation.
The resources in high-inflation economies
diverted from productive activities to nonproductive
financial transactions are enormous. In the hyperinflations
in Europe in the 1920s and again in various emerging mar-
ket countries in the 1980s, we saw financial sectors grow
severalfold. A number of estimates put the rise in the
financial sector share of GDP on the order of 1 percent
for every 10 percentage points of inflation up to inflation
of about 100 percent. The economies that experienced high
inflation consumed more financial transactions for an
essentially given amount of real goods and services.
If individuals must spend more time, effort, and
resources engaging in financial transactions because of the
uncertainty inflation engenders, then more of the economy’s
productive capacity is transferred to the activity of handling
transactions. Clearly, given my background, I am not
opposed to an expansion of the financial sector that stems
from growth of productivity, growth that offers benefits to
the public. Equally clearly, I see an expansion of the financial
sector that stems from an increasing number of people
employed as middlemen, where none would be needed
without the distortion of rising inflation and its attendant
uncertainty, as growth that diverts resources better
employed elsewhere. A bank branch on every corner means
a corner store on none.
In short, the costs of overinvestment in the financial
sector, like the costs of all inflation-induced nonproductive
activities—such as tax code dodges—decrease the resource
base available to the economy for growth. A move to price
stability would give these economies the necessary
incentives to shift resources back to productive uses. In the
case of the financial sector in a high-inflation economy, the
transfer of resources to productive uses could be as large as
a few percentage points of GDP. This can be serious money
indeed. And this is just one of the benefits of regaining
price stability.
Rapid moves toward price stability from high
inflation, however, do have their costs under certain
circumstances. The overdevelopment of a sector for no
reason other than the inflation rate is precisely one of those
circumstances. The removal of the distortionary incentive—
inflation—leads to a rapid transfer of resources out of that
sector, causing unemployment and business failures to
follow: what was boom, goes bust. In those very same
countries where we saw the overexpansion of the financial
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when inflation was finally brought down. This implies an
additional argument for price stability. Namely, in a
low-inflation environment, these boom-bust cycles created
by distortionary incentives are less likely to emerge and can
be more easily contained when they arise.
The avoidance of such unnecessary boom-bust
cycles also limits the serious social costs that inflation can
impose. For one, inflation may strain a country’s social fabric,
pitting different groups in a society against each other as
each group seeks to make certain its wages keep up with the
rising level of prices. Moreover, as we all know, inflation also
tends to fall particularly hard on the less fortunate in society,
often the last to get employment and the first to lose it.
These people do not possess the economic clout to keep their
income streams steady, or even buy necessities, when a bout
of inflation leads to a boom-bust scenario for the economy.
When the bust comes, they also suffer disproportionately.
It is important to note, however, that if we are to
set a goal for monetary policy, we must be clear as to what
we can expect monetary policy to do and what we know it
cannot do. What monetary policy can do is to anchor
inflation at low price levels over the long term and thereby
lock in inflation expectations. In addition, monetary policy
can help offset the effects of financial crises as well as pre-
vent extreme downturns in the economy. 
Over the past twenty years, there has been an
emerging consensus among policymakers and economists
that an activist monetary policy to stimulate output and
reduce unemployment beyond its sustainable level leads to
higher inflation but not to lower unemployment or higher
output. Moreover, although some countries have managed
to experience rapid growth in the presence of high inflation
rates, often with the help of extensive indexation, none has
been able to do so without encountering severe difficulties
at a later stage. It is thus widely recognized today that
there is no long-run trade-off between inflation and unem-
ployment. As a result, we have witnessed a growing com-
mitment among central banks throughout the world to
price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy.
One point is worth emphasizing: Allowing even a
low level of inflation to persist without a commitment to
bring that level downward toward price stability per-
mits—and may even encourage—expectations for still
sharper price rises in the future. Such expectations provide
an opening for a demand-driven burst of inflation. 
But what monetary policy cannot do, in and of
itself, is produce economic growth. Economic growth
stems from increases in the supply of capital and labor and
from the productivity with which labor and capital are used,
neither of which is directly influenced by monetary policy.
However, without doubt, monetary policy can help foster
economic growth by ensuring a stable price environment. 
Some would argue that establishing price stability
as the primary goal of monetary policy means that a central
bank would no longer be concerned about output or job
growth. I would like to make clear for the record that I
believe this view to be simply wrong. A stable price and
financial environment almost certainly will enhance the
capacity of monetary policy to fight occasions of cyclical
weakness in the economy. What is important to bear in
mind is that by ensuring a stable price environment, mon-
etary policy helps foster economic growth. This is a key
point—and is often overlooked.
In trying to determine the extent of future infla-
tion, a central bank must look at a broad array of economic
indicators that reflect demand pressures and supply devel-
opments in the economy. Unfortunately, there is no single
summary measure that provides a reliable overall assess-
ment of the many complex and diverse influences on infla-
tion, which makes it more difficult within most countries
to reach a national consensus on policy at any point. None-
theless, while its one explicit goal must be price stability,
monetary policy can and must also maintain the broad
environment for sustainable economic growth.
TARGETING FRAMEWORKS 
FOR MONETARY POLICY 
How have central banks sought to achieve price stability?
Some countries have begun to commit their central banks
statutorily to pursuing the objective of price stability and are
granting them a high degree of independence to do so.
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average rate of inflation and its variability tend to decline in
the presence of increased independence for central banks.
This is why so many governments, particularly among the
emerging market countries, have been providing their central
banks with increased autonomy.
Once a commitment has been made to price stability
as the goal of monetary policy—and that commitment has
been entrusted to an independent central bank—there are
several possible approaches to implementing that goal.
While the choice will depend on a country’s history, economic
conditions, and traditions, all successful approaches share
two important features: first, they focus on a long-term
time horizon and, second, they provide a transparent standard
for the assessment of policy. For many of these approaches,
what guides monetary policy is an announced target. Such
a target is one proven means of credibly conveying to the
public the commitment to price stability and thereby lock-
ing in inflation expectations.
There are a number of possible targets for monetary
policy. All have been used with success in some countries
while meeting with failure in others, depending upon the
economic context in which they have been implemented.
It is useful to step back and review briefly the advantages
and drawbacks, as I see them, of three different target-
ing frameworks—exchange rates, monetary aggregates,
and inflation. 
Fixing the value of the domestic currency relative
to that of a low-inflation country is one approach central
banks have used to pursue price stability. The advantage
of an exchange rate target is its clarity, which makes it
easily understood by the public. In practice, it obliges the
central bank to limit money creation to levels comparable
to those of the country to whose currency it is pegged.
When credibly maintained, an exchange rate target can
lower inflation expectations to the level prevailing in the
anchor country.
Experiences with fixed exchange rates, however,
point to a number of drawbacks. A country that fixes its
exchange rate surrenders control of its domestic monetary
policy. It can neither respond to domestic shocks that are
not felt by the anchor country nor avoid shocks transmitted
by the anchor country. Moreover, in the environment of
open, global capital markets, fixed exchange rate regimes
are subject to sudden speculative attacks when markets
perceive that domestic needs and exchange commitments
diverge. These speculative attacks can be very disruptive to
any country’s economy.
On balance, it seems that a fixed exchange rate
approach to price stability makes most sense when the
country adopting it has an economy closely tied to the
country or countries it is pegging to and is thus subject to
similar international shocks in any case. This approach
could also be worthwhile if a country is unable—for whatever
reason—to make a credible commitment to price stability
on a domestic basis alone. In either situation, the country
must have available a larger, low-inflation anchor country
to which it can peg its currency.
Targeting monetary aggregates is another
approach many central banks used in the 1970s and 1980s.
This approach has been successfully maintained by a few
prominent countries. Given a dependable relationship
between the targeted monetary aggregate and the goal of
price stability—where movement in the monetary aggregate
predicts movement in prices—this framework offers a
number of advantages. Like exchange rate targeting, an
announced monetary target is easily understood by the
public. In fact, it conveys more information than an
exchange rate target because it shows where monetary policy
is and where inflation is likely to be going. The targeting
of monetary aggregates has the additional advantage of
focusing policy on a quantity that a central bank can control
quickly, easily, and directly.
It is important to emphasize that the advantages
of a monetary aggregate target are totally dependent upon
the predictability of the relationship between the money
target and the inflation goal. If fluctuations in the velocity of
money—perhaps due to financial innovation—weaken this
relationship, this framework will not bring price stability.
In the United States, these relationships are not suffi-
ciently stable for the monetary targeting approach to work.
A third approach to price stability is to target
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central banks over the past several years, as the following
study shows, and the initial results appear positive. The
advantage inflation targeting shares with exchange rate
and monetary targeting is its transparency to the public.
The commitment to price stability is made clear in policy
terms, and deviations from the pursuit of the inflation target
over the longer term are obvious. Like a monetary aggre-
gate target, an inflation target also provides monetary policy
with the necessary flexibility to respond to economic needs
in the short term. Finally, targeting inflation avoids the
problem of velocity shocks because monetary policy is no
longer dependent upon the money-inflation relationship.
The main drawback of inflation targeting is that
inflation itself is not directly or even easily controllable by
the monetary authorities. Furthermore, policy moves in
pursuit of the inflation target only take effect with a lag, so
that success in hitting the target is not quickly apparent.
This is a problem that is not present in either exchange
rate or monetary aggregate targeting. These difficulties
may mean that the target cannot strictly be met at times,
which, at a minimum, could lead to a rise in inflation
expectations. Nevertheless, for countries that are unable
or unwilling to fix their exchange rate to that of another
country and cannot rely on stable relationships between
monetary aggregates and goals, the inflation target
approach offers a transparent means of commitment
over the longer term. I believe that the inflation-targeting
approach to price stability merits further study and
consideration.
WHAT  A STRATEGY FOR MONETARY 
POLICY REQUIRES
In my view, therefore, the challenge to monetary policy in
today’s environment is to consider how we may most
effectively build on our current low inflation by making its
permanence a credible policy goal. This goal raises a host of
important questions.
For one, even if we agree—as I believe we already
do—that price stability must be the primary long-term
goal of monetary policy, what exactly does price stability
mean in practical terms over both the intermediate and
long term? Second, what kind of institutional structure is
needed to enable the central bank to convey to the markets
and the public an explicit commitment to price stability?
A related question is how should such a policy be articulated
to the public to make the central bank accountable and to
foster a political consensus in support of this commitment?
Finally, how can an explicit policy commitment to price
stability be implemented in practice without pushing the
economy too hard in one direction or another? These are a few
of the questions we at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
are asking ourselves as we consider the merits of our country’s
taking a step further in its conduct of monetary policy.
Let me offer two possible basic definitions whose
relevance depends on the time frame with which policy-
makers are concerned. One definition would apply over the
long term. In this time frame, as I stated at the outset, I
would define price stability as being reached when inflation
is not a consideration in household and business decisions. 
What does this mean in practice? We know that,
as currently measured, a zero inflation rate is not the same
thing as price stability. This is because of well-known
errors in measuring inflation that stem from many factors,
including how quality improvements and new products are
valued in the consumer price index. Although there is
much research on this topic, economists and policymakers
cannot agree upon a single number for the magnitude of this
measurement error. In most studies, the error has been esti-
mated to range from 0.5 percent to 2.0 percent. Therefore, as
a practical matter, price stability may best be thought of as
an inflation rate falling somewhere within this range.
Were we to move to a monetary policy strategy
that has a numerical inflation goal, given the problems
with measurement error, how might this goal be set? If the
inflation goal is set too high, we run the risk of allowing
the start of an upward spiral in inflation expectations and
inflation. Indeed, this is why I do not believe that price
stability is consistent with the 3 percent inflation rate we
currently have in the United States.
If, on the other hand, the inflation goal is set too
low, we run the risk of tipping the economy into a deflation in
which the true price level is actually falling. History has6F R B N Y  E CONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / AUGUST 1997
shown that deflation can be extremely harmful to the
economy in general, and to financial markets in particular.
The worst financial crises in our history have been associated
with deflationary periods. 
Therefore, were we to set a numerical inflation
goal for monetary policy, I believe that an appropriate
number for this goal should be within the reasonable range
of measurement error—but in the upper end of the range
because of the dangers of deflation. Such a numerical goal
could be understood as the premium needed to prevent the
economy from being tipped toward deflation or needlessly
forgoing output.
Thus, in the long term, a numerical definition for
price stability would provide a framework for the discus-
sion and evaluation of monetary policy. In practical terms,
this would mean that the Federal Reserve would be held
accountable to—and when successful, judged credible
by—an explicit inflation performance standard that would
ensure stable inflation expectations.
In the intermediate term, by contrast, over a
period of, say, three years—the time horizon over which
monetary policy affects inflation—the goal of monetary
policy is to put the economy on the path that moves it
toward long-term price stability, taking into account the
economic and financial pressures on the economy. At low
levels of inflation, there are substantial risks to the economy
from driving out the remaining inflation too quickly. In the
current environment, therefore, the path for monetary policy
in the intermediate term would have to be gradual. 
Such an effort might require the numerical inflation
goal to sometimes be above the long-term goal for a period
of time, but then to trend downward toward the long-term
goal. In practice, this means that even though the intermedi-
ate policy goal would change, the underlying strategy and the
long-term goal of price stability would remain the same.
This gradual and forward-looking strategy is
essentially the course that the Federal Reserve has been fol-
lowing over the past several years. Integral to this course
have been increased efforts toward greater transparency in
the conduct of monetary policy. The announcement of
changes in policy at the conclusion of Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) meetings is evidence of these efforts.
What, then, might be some of the advantages of
further increasing transparency by committing the Federal
Reserve to an explicit inflation goal? For one, were the
Federal Reserve to formalize its strategy by announcing
specific intermediate and long-term goals for price stabil-
ity, it might reduce uncertainty about policy. Moreover, the
Federal Reserve could clarify why specific policy moves
were made at specific times, with reference to its numerical
intermediate-term goal.
In addition, an explicit commitment to price sta-
bility and specific numerical goals for inflation could help
lock in low inflation expectations, making future inflations
and disinflations less likely. Lastly, I believe that, were the
Federal Reserve to move to the articulation of such a strat-
egy, public discussion and evaluation of monetary policy
would be directed to a tighter, less contentious framework
than that which currently exists. This is because the perfor-
mance of the Federal Reserve in fulfilling its monetary
responsibilities would be the issue, while the goals would
be unambiguous and well established.
The institutional framework to implement such a
strategy is, of course, a question. I believe that the mandate
for price stability is of sufficient importance to society that
it should be set by the legislative process. Were such an
approach to be formalized, the Federal Reserve could
articulate its strategy as it currently does under the
Humphrey-Hawkins law, or Congress might choose to
replace the Humphrey-Hawkins law. The fundamental
point is that once numerical inflation goals were set, it
would be logical and useful to create some kind of an
institutional framework for the Federal Reserve to report
its progress in meeting its monetary policy goals.
THE NEED FOR DEBATE ON MONETARY 
POLICY STRATEGY
I am pleased to share these thoughts with you, encouraged as
I am by favorable developments in monetary policy and the
credibility I believe the Federal Reserve has earned these past
several years in controlling prices while encouraging both
growth of the real economy and financial system stabil-
ity. The discussion of the appropriate strategy for monetary
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intellectual one, although, I hasten to add, one not confined
to ivory towers. This is why we are studying these issues at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Public debate about these issues has begun, and
certainly there are many points of view to listen to and
evaluate. My remarks and the study that follows are
intended to contribute to and help stimulate such discussions.
The perspective adopted in the following study, after a
review of a variety of experiences in other countries, is
generally favorable toward explicit inflation targets. But I
recognize that this is a difficult and complex subject, that
the value of such targets may not be the same in every
country and at all times, and that others may see benefits
in alternative approaches to monetary policy. If my remarks
and the study provoke further debate on these important
issues at the heart of monetary policy and our nation’s
economic welfare, I will consider our efforts to be a success.
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